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1 Motivation1
Several empirical studies over the past years have argued that a combination of im-2
paired financial services, a sharp drop in productivity and lack of supply side reforms3
has generated severe contractions and sharp drops in asset prices observed across4
many advanced economies since the beginning of the Great Recession. Broadbent5
(2012) finds that the main reason for the most recent contraction in the UK business6
cycle has been a contraction in the supply side. He argues that a combination of un-7
even demand across sectors combined with an impaired financial system (due to its8
inability to effectively reallocate resources sufficiently quickly to respond to shocks)9
has led to a reduction in aggregate output per employee. Equally, in a business10
cycle accounting exercise, Chadha and Warren (2012) find that both the efficiency11
wedge as well as labour wedge have equally been key drivers in the most recent12
UK recession. However, while the contractions might show up in those wedges, the13
original shocks might not necessarily originate from the supply side of the economy.14
Using a standard financial frictions model, they show that an asset price shock might15
equally appear in the supply-side wedges and generate equivalent losses to a scenario16
where shocks originate in the supply side. Therefore they suggest that the supply17
side might be a propagator of shock originated elsewhere rather than being the key18
cause of contractions. The model results of Chiarella and De Guilmi (2011) point19
in the same direction. Equivalently, for Italy, Manasse (2013) has argued that the20
main cause behind the most recent recession (and some other southern Euroarea21
countries) has been a weak and anaemic production and financial sector. A lack22
of reform in the credit market combined with stagnation in the product-and labour23
markets has resulted in weak productivity and low competitiveness performance for24
more than a decade.25
Yet the interaction between financial frictions and the supply side has not been26
extensively studied in the theoretical macroeconomics (or finance) literature. In the27
few studies where such interactions are captured, such as Christiano et al (2005),28
or Gertler et al (2011), the models do not manage to capture the tight (positive)29
evolution between asset prices on one hand, and credit, production and productivity30
on the other. Since product markets are complete, imperfections from the credit31
market do not translate into stagnation in productivity, and further down the line32
a sustained drop in asset prices. Instead, credit only affects asset prices insofar33
that agents face constraints in borrowing, and thus in their earnings. However, it34
2
is impossible to generate endogenous sustained drops in asset prices. Since beliefs 1
are perfect and rational, these imperfections are corrected relatively quickly on the 2
market unless new shocks emerge. This is because in these frameworks expectations 3
adjust quickly and there is no discrepancy on the market regarding the future path 4
of the economy, allowing a quick market readjustment. 5
In the current paper, on the other hand, we take a different path to the ex- 6
isting literature and examine the interaction between credit imperfections, produc- 7
tion/productivity and asset prices under a framework of bounded rationality and 8
heterogeneous expectations. In particular, we wish to examine how imperfect finan- 9
cial markets coupled with (imperfect) stock market beliefs affect the allocations on 10
the production side of the economy. We do not claim that this is the only way to 11
examine the interactions, but provide a novel and interesting avenue to analyse the 12
role of limited cognitive abilities on the feedback mechanism between credit, pro- 13
duction and asset prices. We will focus our analysis on three channels: the role of 14
credit frictions for production and asset prices, the role of imperfect information for 15
(expected) production and productivity, and the role of heterogeneous expectations 16
for asset prices. To check the validity and consistency of the model, we perform the 17
standard impulse response analysis, analysis in business cycle frequency, as well as 18
statistical matching with US data using a sample of more than 60 years of macroe- 19
conomic and financial data. 20
Impulse response analyses show that (temporary) supply-side shocks do not only 21
improve the fundamentals in the economy but cause a brief wave of market sentiment 22
(or animal spirit), which in the case of a positive shock result in a more-than pro- 23
portional increase in output, capital supply, bank equity, and fall in interest rate. 24
Moreover, credit supply to entrepreneurs is permanently increased, which means 25
that firms can access greater external financing in the future. As a result, firm 26
productivity is permanently improved. 27
The statistical validation of the model (including moment matching) show that 28
the model is capable of replicating important characteristics found in the US data. 29
This includes variables such as the (risk-free) interest rate, inflation, deposits, firm 30
financing spread and net worth of banks. It is also successful in matching several 31
supply-side relations (capital-firm credit, inflation-interest rate) as well as their auto- 32
correlations (output, capital and inflation). Moreover, we find a strong co-movement 33
between asset prices on one hand, and net worth and the financing spread on the 34
other hand. We are capable of replicating long and sustained booms and subsequent 35
3
sharp reversals in asset prices and net worth, which has been charactieristic of the1
US macro-financial cycles since mid-1990’s.2
2 Model set-up3
To incorporate a supply side with an asset price bubble and financing constraints in a4
New-Keynesian macro framework, we apply the following adjustments to the model5
in De Grauwe and Macchiarelli (2015). The first modification is an extension of the6
financial accelerator mechanism onto input markets. We allow a firm’s purchasing7
position on the input markets to directly depend on its financial state. A stronger8
financial (net worth) position allows a firm to borrow more, which in turn presses9
the marginal costs down, and allows it to buy capital inputs at a (relatively) lower10
price.11
The second modification is a pay-in-advance constraint on the input market. We12
impose the condition that (a share of) the cost of capital must be paid in advance13
of purchase in order to insure capital good producers that they will sell what they14
produce. It is a kind of depository insurance. We make the pre-payment share time15
varying over the business cycle in order to capture the asymmetries in financial (or16
liquidity) positions over the cycle.17
The third modification we introduce is a utilization rate of capital. Produc-18
ing firms, apart from choosing the amount of capital to purchase, choose the rate19
at which capital will be used in production activities. Higher share increases the20
number of (intermediate) goods produced for a fixed amount of capital at the same21
time as it increases the rate of capital depreciation. More details are provided in22
subsection 2.2.23
With respect to the original paper of De Grauwe and Macchiarelli (2015), we24
use most of their original model, but exclude the time-invariant leverage ratio at25
the same time as we extend the constant bank net worth and the external finance26
premium. Moreover, we include a production sector (CGP and entrepreneurs). Full27
list of equations is included in the appendix.28
We will provide a detailed outline of the three modifications in the next subsec-29
tion (including a description of the incomplete information-and learning framework).30
The model is then solved in section 3 and the simulated quantitative results are anal-31
ysed in section 4. Section 5 concludes.32
4
2.1 Supply side and financial frictions 1
In what follows, we will disentangle capital production from capital utilization rate, 2
and introduce variable capital usage in an otherwise standard financial accelerator 3
mechanism (augmented with stock market cycles) as in DeGrauwe and Macchiarelli 4
(2015).1 Capital good producers produce capital which they rent to entrepreneurs 5
at a cost Rst . Entrepreneurs use the newly purchased capital and labour to produce 6
intermediate goods. Whereas capital good producers and entrepreneurs operate 7
in perfectly competitive goods markets, retailers are monopolistically competitive. 8
Therefore they price discriminate, resulting in price frictions on the aggregate supply 9
side (Phillips curve). 10
2.1.1 Capital good producers 11
Following Gerali et al (2010), perfectly competitive capital good producers (CGP) 12
produce a homogeneous good called “capital services” using input of the final output 13
from entrepreneurs (1 − δ)kt−1 and retailers (it), and the production is subject to 14
investment adjustment costs. They sell new capital to entrepreneurs at price Qt. 15
The objective of a CGP is to choose a Kt and It to solve: 16
max
Kt,It
E0Σ
∞
t=0Λ0,t[Qt[Kt − (1− δ)Kt−1]− It] (1)
subject to: 17
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 + [1− κi
2
[
it
qk
t
it−1
− 1]2]It (2)
where [1 − κi
2
(
it
qk
t
it−1
− 1)2]It is the adjustment cost function. κt denotes the cost 18
for adjusting investment and qkt is a shock to the efficiency of investment. Including 19
adjustment costs of investment in the production of capital solves the so-called 20
“investment puzzle” and produces the hump-shaped investment in response to a 21
monetary policy shock (Smets and Wouters, 2007 and Christiano et al, 2011). 22
2.1.2 Entrepreneurs 23
Perfectly competitive entrepreneurs produce intermediate goods using the constant 24
returns to scale technology: 25
1For a discussion of the remaining model set-up, we refer to the aforementioned paper and
DeGrauwe (2008, 2012).
5
Yt = At[ψ(ut)Kt]
αL1−α (3)
with At being the stochastic total factor productivity, ut the capacity utilization1
rate, and Kt and Lt capital and labour inputs. Capital is homogeneous in this2
model.2 We assume a fixed survival rate of entrepreneurs in each period γ, in3
order to ensure a constant amount of exit and entry of firms in the model. This4
assumption also assures that firms will always depend on external finances for their5
capital purchases, so they will never become financially self-sufficient.6
We introduce a shock to productivity zt (calibrated to 0.5) to later examine the7
impact of a productivity increase in the macroeconomic performance. With the8
shock, equation 3 becomes:9
Yt = At[
z
tψ(ut)Kt]
αL1−α (4)
Just as in the financial accelerator model (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1999)10
we will continue to work under the assumption that all earnings (after paying the11
input costs) from production are re-invested into the company such that a constant12
share is paid out to shareholders.3 This is why entrepreneurs will maximize their13
value function rather than their production function.414
Entrepreneurs also choose the level of capacity utilization, ψ(ut). As is standard15
in the capital utilization literature, the model assumes that using capital more in-16
tensively raises the rate at which it depreciates.5 The increasing convex function17
ψ(ut)kt denotes the (relative) cost in units of investment good of setting the utiliza-18
tion rate to ut. This is chosen before the realization of the production shock (see19
Auernheimer and Trupkin (2014) for similar assumption). This timing assumption20
is important because it separates the choice of the stock of productive factor Kt,21
taken before the revelation of the states of nature, from the choice of the flow of22
factor utKt, taken during the production process.23
The choice of the rate of capital utilization involves the following trade-off. On24
2We could have made capital firm-specific, but the set-up would have to be much more complex
without qualitatively altering the results. Using homogeneous capital assumption is standard in
these type of models, see for instance Bernanke et al (1999), Gerali et al (2010), Gertler et al
(2012). Chiarella and De Guilmi (2011) develop a model where firms hold heterogeneous capital
structures, and examine the transmission of (micro-level) financial shocks to the production sector.
3In our exercises, we will set this share to 0, similar to Bernanke et al (1999).
4And so yt is not a direct argument of the function.
5We could equally assume a fixed rate of capital depreciation and impose a cost as a function
of output, as in Christiano et al (2005) or Gerali et al (2010).
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the one hand, a higher ut implies a higher output. On the other hand, there is 1
a cost from a higher depreciation of the capital stock. Therefore this rate can be 2
understood as an index that shows how much of the stock of capital is operated 3
relative to the steady state, per unit of time, given a capital-labour services ratio. 4
Moreover we specify the following functional form for ψ(ut): 5
ψ(ut) = ξ0 + ξ1(ut − 1) + ξ2
2
(ut − 1)2 (5)
in line with Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006), Gerali et al (2010), and Auern- 6
heimer and Truphin (2014).6 To examine the sensitivity of capital utilization on 7
production, we will introduce a shock in utilization costs uct according to: 8
ψ(ut) = ξ0 + ξ1(ut − 1) + ξ2
2
(ut − 1)2 + uct (6)
where uct has the following AR structure: 9
uct = ρucuct−1 + uct (7)
and uct is a white noise shock, which is calibrated to 0.5. In our simulations, we 10
calibrate the AR component ρuc to 0.1 in order to strictly limit the possibility of the 11
shock driving the model dynamics. However, a simple white noise utilization cost 12
shock is excessively short-lived, and would not allow us to study the endogenous 13
dynamics in full. 14
To understand how a firm’s financial position influences its’ purchasing power in 15
the capital input market, we need to understand the costs it faces. A firm minimizes 16
the following cost function: 17
S(Yt) = min
k,l
[RstKt + wtLt] (8)
The real marginal cost is therefore s(Yt) =
∂S(Yt)
∂(Yt)
, which is: 18
s(Yt) =
1
1− α
1−α 1
α
α
(rst )
α(wt)
1−α (9)
The gross return on capital is defined as Rst =
St−St−1
St−1
. Keeping the wage rate 19
constant, an increase in the (stock) market value of capital reduces the (relative) 20
cost of capital service inputs, purchased at today’s capital price.7 21
6In the simulations, ut will be normalized such that ψ(ut) = 0.80.
7In line with the costs that intermediate firms face in the model of Christiano et al (2005).
7
This is easier to see in the entrepreneur’s budget constraint:81
St+1Kt+1 + wtLt + ψ(ut)kt−1 +RtBt−1 + (1− ϑ)StKt = Yt
Xt
+Bt + St(1− δ)Kt−1 ⇒
St+1Kt+1 + wtLt + ψ(ut)Kt +Rt[StKt −Nt] + (1− ϑ)StKt =
Yt
Xt
+ St+1Kt+1 −Nt+1] + St(1− δ)Kt−1 (10)
where2
Bt = StKt −Nt (11)
orBt is the amount entrepreneurs borrow, δ being the depreciation rate of capital,3
ψ(ut)Kt−1 the cost of setting a level ut of the utilization rate, ϑ is the share of capital4
purchases required to be paid in advance by CGP, and
P ft
Pt
= 1
Xt
is the relative5
competitive price of the final good in relation to the capital good (i.e. mark-up).96
An increase in the (stock) market price (right-hand side) has two effects.10 First,7
it reduces the contemporaneous (relative) cost of capital purchases since firms can8
borrow more and pay a higher pre-payment share ϑ of capital. Second, a higher9
market price means that the probability of default of an entrepreneur drops (since10
the value of the firm is higher), CGP will expect entrepreneurs to be solvent in the11
next period and will therefore require a smaller pre-payment (i.e. ϑ on the left-hand12
side will fall). Let us elaborate on this second mechanism a bit further.13
As a form of depository insurance, CGP will in some periods require entrepreneurs14
to pay in period t a share of the total capital produced and delivered to entrepreneurs15
in period t+1. In particular, when CGPs suspect that entrepreneurs will either face16
liquidity problems, a lower production, or a lower collateral value in the next pe-17
riod, they assume the firm to be less solvent. Because the default probability of18
entrepreneurs rises, CGP become suspicious of the entrepreneur’s ability to pay for19
the entire capital purchase. Therefore, as an insurance mechanism, CGP will ask20
8We assume that entrepreneurs borrow up to a maximum permitted by the borrowing con-
straint.
9Note that ϑSt+1Kt+1 ≤ St+1Kt+1.
10For an explanation of the evolution of stock prices, we refer to Annex I, or De Grauwe and
Macchiarelli (2015).
8
the entrepreneur to pay in advance a share of its capital purchases.11 The share to 1
be paid is tightly linked to the amount that the entrepreneur can borrow on the 2
credit market Bt. 3
Formally, the pay-in-advance constraint that entrepreneurs face in the input 4
market is: 5
St+1Kt+1 ≤ ϑtBt ≡ ϑt[St+1Kt+1 −Nt] (12)
We allow ϑ to vary over time in order to capture the variations in CGP’s pre- 6
cautionary motive over the business cycle. In theory, a value of 1 means that the 7
entrepreneur will need to use all of his external finances (loans) to pay for the cap- 8
ital purchases since CGP expect entrepreneur’s financial (cash) position to sharply 9
worsen in the next period. Conversely, a value of 0 means that no pre-payment is 10
required as CGP expect the entrepreneur to be able to re-pay in full in the next 11
period. As a result, the constraint will not be binding. Considering the entire pa- 12
rameter spectrum of ϑ, the constraint will almost always be binding, except for the 13
extreme case when ϑ = 0, or no pre-payment is required at all due to very sound 14
financial conditions of the entrepreneur. In our long-run simulations, the constraint 15
is mostly binding since slightly more than half of the time ϑ is above 0. This implies 16
that in most cases CGPs require entrepreneurs to pay at least a share of their input 17
purchases in advance. 18
Both the individual and aggregate capital stock evolves according to: 19
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 + Ψ( It
Kt
)Kt−1 (13)
where Ψ( It
Kt
)Kt−1 are the capital adjustment costs in the usage of capital. Ψ(.) 20
is increasing and convex, and Ψ(0) = 0.12 Note that the micro-founded dynamic 21
problem of entrepreneurs is very similar to the myopic expected utility maximization 22
problem of agents in Chiarella et al (2006). 23
11We could equivalently assume that legal conditions/constraints stipulate that entrepreneurs
need to pay in advance for their inputs as in Champ and Freedman (1990, 1994). Our approach is
analogue to the one taken in Fuerst (1995) or Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) for labour input
costs.
12The log-linearized version of this expression is: kt = (1− δ)kt−1 + δit, as in Bernanke, Gertler
and Gilchrist (1999) or Gerba (2017) and the one used in the simulations. δit is the steady state
version of Ψ( ItKt )Kt−1.
9
2.2 Aggregate dynamics1
Since we have introduced a production economy in the baseline behavioural model,2
we also need to adapt the aggregate system equations. First we need to link capital3
to real interest rate. Linking the investment demand equation from DeGrauwe and4
Macchiarelli (2015):5
it = i(ρ)t = e1E˜tyt+1 + e2(ρ− E˜tpit+1); e2 < 0 (14)
to the aggregate capital accumulation 13, we find that the relation between6
capital and the real interest rate is:7
kt = (1−δ)kt−1+Ψ( it
it−1
)i(ρ)t = (1−δ)kt−1+Ψ( it
it−1
)e1E˜tyt+1+e2(rt+xt−E˜tpit+1); e2 < 0
(15)
Note that we have introduced E˜t in both expressions above. That is the be-8
havioural extension of the rational expectations Et operator, where the formation9
of these expectations is ruled by a particular learning process described in the next10
subsection.13 Continuing by incorporating a supply side into the aggregate system11
of De Grauwe and Macchiarelli (2015) - by combining equations 14, 15 and 5 - gives:12
yt = a1E˜tyt+1+(1−a1)yt−1+a2(rt−E˜tpit+1)+(a2+a3)xt+(a1−a2)ψ(ut)kt+Adjt+t; (a1−a2) > 0
(16)
Note that the first four terms are equal to the aggregate demand expression13
in De Grauwe and Macchiarelli (2015). Besides that, aggregate demand now also14
depends on the usable capital in the production, utkt but discounted for the cost of15
financing (xt). Christiano et al. (2005), Smets and Wouters (2007), and Gerali et16
al. (2010) arrive at the same resource constraint expression in their models. There17
is an adjustment cost in investment given by equation 15, which we capture by18
Adjt = Ψ(
it
it−1
) ≡ Ψ( It
Kt
).14 However, it will be calibrated in such a way to equal δ,19
as in standard DSGE models.20
13The standard rational expectations (RE) Et is a special case of the broader expectations oper-
ator we consider in this paper. In other words, if we reduce our system to a standard expectations-
setting, then the model would only remain with credit-and supply side frictions. There would not
be any information frictions anymore.
14These two are equivalent since, via the Cobb-Douglas production function, capital has a
constant share in production over time and is homogeneous.
10
Monetary policy affects aggregate demand in two ways. First, it affects the 1
opportunity cost of current consumption and investment, via the third term in 2
equation 16. Second, it affects return on investment in expression 15, which in 3
turn affects capital demand, captured by the fifth term in the aggregate demand 4
expression. To examine the impact of changes in interest rate on the economy, 5
we introduce a (negative) monetary policy shock (mpt calibrated to 0.5) with the 6
following autoregressive process: 7
rt = rt−1 + γpit + (1− γ)yt + mpt (17)
We will examine the system’s response to this shock in section 4.1.1. 8
The reader will notice that aggregate demand also depends on the external fi- 9
nance (or risk) premium xt. This is a reduced form expression for investment, since 10
investment is governed directly by this premium, and therefore it is the dependent 11
variable (see DeGrauwe and Macchiarelli (2015) for a derivation of this term). 12
The aggregate supply (AS) equation is obtained from the price discrimination 13
problem of retailers (monopolistically competitive): 14
pit = b1E˜tpit+1 + (1− b1)pit−1 + b2yt + νt (18)
As explained in DeGrauwe and Macchiarelli (2015), b1 = 1 corresponds to the 15
New-Keynesian version of AS with Calvo-pricing (Woodford (2003), Branch and 16
McGaugh (2009)). Setting 0 < b1 < 1 we incorporate some price inertia in the vein 17
of Gali and Gertler (1999). Equally, the parameter b2 varies between 0 and ∞ and 18
reflects the degree of price rigidities in the context of a Calvo pricing assumption 19
(DeGrauwe, 2012). A value of b2 = 0 corresponds to complete price rigidity and 20
b2 = ∞ to perfect price flexibility (firms have a probability of 1 of changing prices 21
in period t). 22
2.3 Expectations formation and learning 23
Next, we wish to characterize the information friction and heterogeneous expecta- 24
tions used in this model. We will focus on two things. First, we will model the 25
cognitive limitation that agents have regarding the aggregate states, which is out of 26
direct control for them. Second, we will outline the learning framework that they 27
use in order to gain a better understanding of those aggregate states. The learning 28
11
framework incorporates heterogeneous expectations in its intrinsic dynamics.1
Under rational expectations, the expectations term will equal its realized value2
in the next period, i.e. EtΦt+1 = Φt+1, denoting generically by Φt any variable3
in the model. However, as anticipated above, we depart from this assumption in4
this framework by considering bounded rationality as in DeGrauwe (2011, 2012).5
Expectations are replaced by a convex combination of heterogeneous expectation6
operators Etyt+1 = E˜tyt+1 and Etpit+1 = E˜tpit+1. In particular, agents forecast7
output and inflation using two alternative forecasting rules: fundamentalist rule vs.8
extrapolative rule. Under the fundamentalist rule, agents are assumed to use the9
steady-state value of the output gap - y∗, here normalized to zero against a naive10
forecast based on the gap’s latest available observation (extrapolative rule). Equally11
for inflation, fundamentalist agents are assumed to base their expectations on the12
central bank’s target - pi∗ against the extrapolists who naively base their forecast on13
a random walk approach.15 We can formally express the fundamentalists in inflation14
and output forecasting as:15
E˜ft pit+1 = pi
∗ (19)
E˜ft yt+1 = y
∗ (20)
and the extrapolists in both cases as:16
E˜et pit+1 = θpit−1 (21)
E˜et yt+1 = θyt−1 (22)
This particular form of adaptive expectations has previously been modelled by17
Pesaran (1987), Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998), and Branch and McGough (2009),18
amongst others. Setting θ = 1 captures the ”naive” agents (as they have a strong19
belief in history dependence), while a θ < 1 or θ > 1 represents an ”adaptive” or an20
”extrapolative” agent (Brock and Hommes, 1998). For reasons of tractability, we21
set θ = 1 in this model.22
All variables here are expressed in gaps. Focusing on their cyclical component23
makes the model symmetric with respect to the steady state (see Harvey and Jaeger,24
15The latest available observation is the best forecast of the future.
12
1993). Therefore, as DeGrauwe and Macchiarelli (2015) show, it is not necessary 1
to include a zero lower bound constraint in the model since a negative interest 2
rate should be understood as a negative interest rate gap. In general terms, the 3
equilibrium forecast/target for each variable is equal to its’ steady state value. 4
Next, selection of the forecasting rule depends on the (historical) performance of 5
the various rules given by a publically available goodness-of-fit measure, the mean 6
square forecasting error (MSFE). After time t realization is revealed, the two pre- 7
dictors are evaluated ex post using MSFE and new fractions of agent types are 8
determined. These updated fractions are used to determine the next period (ag- 9
gregate) forecasts of output-and inflation gaps, and so on. Agents’ rationality con- 10
sists therefore in choosing the best-performing predictor using the updated fitness 11
measure. There is a strong empirical motivation for inserting this type of switch- 12
ing mechanism amongst different forecasting rules (see DeGrauwe and Macchiarelli 13
(2015) for a brief discussion of the empirical literature, Frankel and Froot (1990) 14
for a discussion of fundamentalist behaviour, and Roos and Schmidt (2012), Cog- 15
ley (2002), Cogley and Sargent (2007) and Cornea, Hommes and Massaro (2013) 16
for evidence of extrapolative behaviour, in particular for inflation forecasts). More 17
recently, Chiarella et al (2012) performed an empirical validation of a reduced-form 18
heterogeneous agent financial model with Markov chain-regime dependent expecta- 19
tions and showed that such a learning mechanism matches well the boom-bust cycle 20
in the US stock market at the same time as it has good predictability power. 21
Just as in Chiarella and Khomin (1999), the aggregate market forecasts of 22
output-and inflation gap is obtained as a weighted average of each rule: 23
E˜tpit+1 = α
f
t E˜
f
t pit+1 + α
e
t E˜
e
t pit+1 (23)
E˜tyt+1 = α
f
t E˜
f
t yt+1 + α
e
t E˜
e
t yt+1 (24)
where αft is the weighted average of fundamentalists, and α
e
t that of the ex- 24
trapolists. Following Chiarella and Khomin (1999), these shares are time-varying 25
and based on the dynamic predictor selection. The mechanism allows to switch 26
between the two forecasting rules based on MSFE / utility of the two rules, and in- 27
crease (decrease) the weight of one rule over the other at each t. Assuming that the 28
utilities of the two alternative rules have a deterministic and a random component 29
(with a log-normal distribution as in Manski and McFadden (1981) or Anderson 30
13
et al (1992)), the two weights can be defined based on each period utility for each1
forecast Uφi,t, i = (y, pi), φ = (f, e) according to:2
αfpi,t =
exp(γU fpi,t)
exp(γU fpi,t) + exp(γU
e
pi,t)
(25)
αfy,t =
exp(γU fy,t)
exp(γU fy,t) + exp(γU
e
y,t)
(26)
αepi,t ≡ 1− αfpi,t =
exp(γU epi,t)
exp(γU fpi,t) + exp(γU
e
pi,t)
(27)
αey,t ≡ 1− αfy,t =
exp(γU ey,t)
exp(γU fy,t) + exp(γU
e
y,t)
(28)
,where the utilities are defined as:3
U fpi,t = −
∞∑
k=0
wk[pit−k−1 − E˜ft−k−2pit−k−1]2 (29)
U fy,t = −
∞∑
k=0
wk[yt−k−1 − E˜ft−k−2yt−k−1]2 (30)
U epi,t = −
∞∑
k=0
wk[pit−k−1 − E˜et−k−2pit−k−1]2 (31)
U ey,t = −
∞∑
k=0
wk[yt−k−1 − E˜et−k−2yt−k−1]2 (32)
and wk = (%
k(1 − %)) (with 0 < % < 1) are gemoetrically declining weights4
adapted to include the degree of forgetfulness in the model (DeGrauwe, 2012). γ is5
a parameter measuring the extent to which the deterministic component of utility6
determines actual choice. A value of 0 implies a perfectly stochastic utility. In that7
case, agents decide to be one type or the other by simply tossing a coin, implying a8
probability of each type equalised to 0.5. On the other hand, γ =∞ imples a fully9
deterministic utility, and the probability of using the fundamentalist (extrapolative)10
rule is either 1 or 0. Another way of interpreting γ is in terms of learning from past11
performance: γ = 0 implies zero willingness to learn, while the willingness increases12
with the size of the parameter, i.e. 0 < γ <∞.13
As mentioned above, agents will subject the performance of both rules to a14
14
goodness-of-fit measure and choose the one that performs best. In that sense, agents 1
are “boundedly” rational and learn from their mistakes. More importantly, this 2
discrete choice mechanism allows to endogenise the distribution of heterogeneous 3
agents over time to the proportion of each agent using a certain rule (parameter 4
αφ, φ = (f, e)). The approach is consistent with the empirical studies (Cornea et al, 5
2012) who show that the distribution of heterogeneous agents varies in reaction to 6
economic volatility (Carroll (2003), Mankiw et al (2004)). 7
2.4 Firm equity 8
To complete the model, we need to characterize the evolution of net worth. In 9
DeGrauwe and Macchiarelli (2015), it is shown that: 10
nf,mt =
1
τt
(LDt−1 + it) (33)
and 11
nf,mt = n¯tSt (34)
where n¯t represents the number of (time-varying) shares of the firm and St is the 12
current (stock) market price. Combining the two, we get that the number of shares 13
is: 14
n¯t =
1
τt
(LDt−1 + it)
St
(35)
Inserting the investment demand equation i(ρ)t = e1E˜t(yt+1) + e2(rt + xt − 15
E˜t(pit+1)) from DeGrauwe and Macchiarelli (2015) into the expression above, we 16
get: 17
Stn¯t =
1
τt
(LDt−1 + e1E˜t(yt+1) + e2(rt + xt − E˜t(pit+1))) (36)
We observe three things. First, net capital (or equity) the firm holds after 18
repaying the cost of borrowing is scaled by the inverse leverage ratio. The more 19
it borrows, the smaller will be its equity in the next period. Second, a higher 20
(expected) production increases its revenues and therefore the capital level (via the 21
capital accumulation function). However, a portion of the production is financed by 22
external funds and thus it will need to pay a cost for those funds, represented by 23
15
the risk-adjusted interest rate rt + xt. However, the more leveraged the firm is, the1
higher the down-payment on loans and therefore the more “exposed” the firm will2
be in recessions. Third, a higher expected inflation implies a reduction in the cost3
of external financing. For a given level of leverage, this reduces firm’s debt exposure4
today and permits her, ceteris paribus to take on additional loans. Finally, note5
that the more leveraged the firm is, the higher is the impact on firm equity (or6
shares) from movements in (stock) market prices. This set-up is analogous to the7
state equation shown in Gerba (2017).8
3 Behavioural model derivations9
3.1 Model solution in the behavioural model10
We solve the model using recursive methods (see DeGrauwe (2012) for further de-11
tails). This allows for non-linear effects. The model has six endogenous variables,12
output gap, inflation, financing spread, savings, capital, and interest rate. The first13
five are obtained after solving the following system:14

1 −b2 0 0 0
−a2c1 1− a2c2 −(a2 + a3) 0 (a1 − a2)ψ(ut)
−ψτ−1t−1e2c1 −ψτ−1t−1e2c1 (1− ψτ−1t−1e2) 0 0
d3c1 −(1− d1 − d3c2) 0 1 0
0 0 e2 0 1


pit
yt
xt
st
kt

=
15
=

b1 0 0 0 −e2
−a2 1− a1 0 0 Ψ( itit−1 )e1
−ψτ−1−1te2 −ψτ−1t−1e2 0 0 0
d3 −d2 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0


E˜t[pit+1]
E˜t[yt+1]
E˜t[xt+1]
E˜t[st+1]
E˜t[kt+1]

+
16
+

1− b2 0 0 0 0
0 1− a′1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 −(1− d1 − d2) 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 (1− δ)


pit−1
yt−1
xt−1
st−1
kt−1

+
16
+
0 0 0
a2c3 0 0
−ψτ−1t−1e2c3 ψτ−1t−1 ψτ−1t−1
d2c3 0 0
e2 0 0


rt−1
Dt−1
nbt−1
+

1 0 0 0
0 a2 1 (a1 − a2)
0 ψ−1τt−1e2 0 0
0 −d3 −(1− d1) 0
0 0 0 1


ηt
ut
t
ucft

Using matrix notation, we can write this as: AZt = BE˜tZt+1 + CZt−1 + DXt−1 + Evt.1
We can solve forZt by inverting: Zt = A
−1(BE˜tZt+1 + CZt−1 + DXt−1 + Evt) 2
and assuring A to be non-singular. 3
Solution for the interest rate rt is obtained by substituting yt and pit into the 4
Taylor rule. Investments, utilization costs, bank equities, loans, labour and deposits 5
are determined by the model solutions for output gap, inflation, financing spread, 6
savings and capital.16 Evolution in expectation of capital stock, which is one of 7
the novelties in this model, follows a similar mechanism to that employed in the 8
forecasting of output and inflation. However, since capital has a constant share 9
in output, via Cobb-Douglas production technology in 3, and because capital is 10
directly related to the inflation rate via the real rate relation in 15, de facto agents 11
simultaneously forecast capital when they forecast output and inflation.17 This 12
follows the same argument used for asset prices in this paper, and in De Grauwe 13
and Macchiarelli (2015). Besides, since capital and its price are driven by the same 14
fundamentals, it is logical to assume that they follow the same learning process or 15
heuristics evolution. Apart from being consistent with the reduced-form version, this 16
also represents a micro-foundation for the entire heuristics set-up since agents do not 17
hold imperfect information about the entire economic structure, but only regarding 18
a very narrow subset of core model variables. However, imperfect information has 19
implications for the entire model via its (contemporaneous, lagged or lead) relation 20
to the entire system. 21
Expectation terms with a tilde E˜t implies that we do not impose rational ex- 22
pectations. Using the system of equations above, if we substitute the law of motion 23
consistent with heterogeneity of agents (fundamentalists and extrapolators), then 24
we can show that the endogenous variables depend linearly on lagged endogenous 25
16However, capital, savings, and the external financing spread do not need to be forecasted as
these do not affect the dynamics of the model (i.e. there is no structure of higher order beliefs as
LIE does not hold in the behavioural model). See section 3.1 in DeGrauwe and Macchiarelli (2015)
for comparison of solutions under rational expectations and bounded rationality (”heuristics”).
17However, it needs to be discounted with the investment adjustment cost as this is the main
friction in the accumulation of capital.
17
variables, their equilibrium forecasts and current exogenous shocks.1
Note that for the forecasts of output and inflation gap, the forward looking terms2
in equations 15, I.1 and I.7 are substituted by the discrete choice mechanism in3
I.18. For a comparison of solutions in the “bounded rationality” model and rational4
expectations framework, see section 3.1 of De Grauwe and Macchiarelli (2015).5
3.2 Calibration and simulations6
To simplify the discussion, we will only present the calibration of the parameters7
that are new in this model. A full parameter list can be found in the Appendix.8
In line with De Grauwe and Macchiarelli (2015), we calibrate the aggregate9
demand parameters (d1, d2, e1) to (0.5, 0.15, 0.1) which is consistent with standard10
macroeconomic simulation results. τ (or a firms’ average leverage ratio) is again set11
to 1.43, following Pesaran and Xu (2013), and κ (or banks’ equity ratio) is, following12
Gerali et al (2010), set to 0.09.13
The parameters specific to this model are set to standard values in the literature.14
The share of capital in the production α is set to 0.30 as in Boissay et al (2013).15
Following Christiano et al (2005), Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007) and Gerali et al16
(2010), we set the capital depreciation rate δ to 0.025. The elasticity of the capital17
utilization adjustment cost function ψ(it) is parametrised to 0.5 as in Smets and18
Wouters (2007).1819
The sensitivity of capital (or investment) to changes in the real interest rate e220
is, in line with the empirical evidence, set to e2 < 0. To conclude, the parameters of21
the function determining adjustment costs for capacity utilization (ξ0, ξ1, ξ2) are set22
to (0.8, 0.3, 0.25) in order to capture the estimation results of Smets and Wouters23
(2005) who find that the capital utilization adjustment costs are between 0.14 and24
0.38 (Euro Area 1983-2002) and 0.21 and 0.42 (US 1983-2002), with a mean of 0.2525
(Euro Area) and 0.31 (US). If we normalize ut to 1 (as in Christiano et al (2005),26
Miao et al (2013) or Auernheimer and Trupkin (2014)), then the cost for utilizing27
capital will be 0.20 (1 − ξ0), which is well within the estimated intervals of Smets28
and Wouters (2005).29
All shocks, except for the capital utilization, are parametrised as white noise,30
which means that their autoregressive component is set to 0. Likewise the standard31
18This is equivalent to setting a κi equal to the estimated range (10.18− 12.81) as in Gerali et
al (2010).
18
deviations of shocks are set to 0.5 across the entire spectrum.19 1
4 Quantitative results 2
Our analysis consists of three parts. The first part is an analysis of (model consistent) 3
impulse responses to a set of independent white noise shocks. Remember that all 4
shocks were calibrated to 0.5. The second is an examination of the (model generated) 5
second-, and higher-order moments to contrast the fit of the model to the US data. 6
The final part consists of depicting and analysing the nature of the model variables 7
over the business cycle. For future work, we wish to compare the quantitative results 8
to a standard DSGE model with an equal mechanism.20 9
4.1 Impulse response analysis 10
Figure II.4 depicts the full impulse responses to a negative monetary policy shock, 11
Figures II.5 to a technology shock, and Figures II.6 to a shock to utilization costs. 12
Note that the numbers on the x-axis indicate number of quarters. All the shocks are 13
introduced in t=100 and we observe the responses over a long period of 60 quarters 14
(or 15 years). The black line represents the median impulse response, while the red 15
intervals depict the full 95% distribution (or confidence interval) of the responses for 16
different initializations. For the sake of clarity and focus, we will only concentrate 17
on the median impulse response in the discussion, which is a good representation of 18
the overall distribution. 19
4.1.1 Monetary policy shock 20
As is standard, an expansionary monetary policy (0.5% fall) leads to a fall in the 21
external finance premium, which relaxes the credit that firms can access and there- 22
fore pushes up investment (0.3%). This pushes up capital accumulation (0.4%). 23
19The AR-component of the shock to capital utilization cost is set conservatively to 0.1, just
enough to generate some persistence in the capital cost structure.
20Before we begin with the analysis, bear in mind that the behavioural model does not have
one steady state that is time invariant for the same calibration (as is standard for the DSGE
method). Therefore, following a white noise shock, the model will not necessarily return to a
previous steady state. If not the same steady state, it can either reach a new steady state, or have
a prolonged response to the initial shock. In other words, there is a possibility for the temporary
shock to have permanent effects in the model (via the animal spirits channel). However, due
to the methodological proximity to the DSGE analogue and because it is a standard evaluation
(and comparison) tool in the literature, we will proceed analysing the impulse responses in the
behavioural model.
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Agents perceive this expansion as a period of positive outlook, which triggers the1
optimism (animal spirits up 0.2%). This optimism is translated into an increase in2
deposits (0.25%) and bank equity (0.3%). The expansion leads to an increase in3
output (0.20%) and a rise in inflation (0.01%), but with a lag of 1 quarter.214
However, this optimism is very brief as the monetary authority raises the interest5
rate (0.1%) to combat the rising inflation. Agents perceive this as the end of the6
expansionary phase, resulting in a reversal of the sentiment to pessimism (animal7
spirits fall by 0.05%). The consequence is a turn in the response of macroeconomic8
and financial aggregates, leading to return of these variables to the steady state.9
Hence in the behavioural model, we see two waves of responses. The first, stan-10
dard in the DSGE models, is driven directly by a monetary policy expansion. The11
second, on the other hand, is purely driven by animal spirits. The response of the12
monetary authority to the initial expansion kills and turns the initial optimism into13
a pessimism (or negative bubble on the financial market). This results in a reversal14
in the financial and macroeconomic aggregates, making the initial monetary expan-15
sion extremely short-lived. This type of market behaviour is difficult to capture in16
standard DSGE models (but frequently observed empirically).17
4.1.2 Technology shock18
Let us now turn to the first of the supply side shocks. An improvement in TFP19
(or equivalently, increase in productivity) of 0.5% results in an inflation reduction20
(1%) and a more than proportional output expansion (1.15%). This is a result from21
both an increase in capacity in the final goods market, as well as from an increase22
in investment (0.3%) following the heavy fall in interest rate (1.3%) as a response23
to the falling inflation. Following this general supply-side expansion, deposits and24
loans to firms also increase (1 and 1.3% respectively) since the value of firm net25
worth (i.e. collateral) has increased. As a consequence of the lower marginal cost26
of investment and higher marginal return on capital, capital accumulation increases27
significantly in the next period (0.5%). This results in a general market optimism28
(animal spirits rise by 0.1%).29
However, as soon as the inflation starts recovering, interest rate react very rapidly30
to their increase and start rising (0.35%). Because of this rise in cost of capital, cou-31
pled with the fall in external financing for firms, investment-and output expansion32
21Initially, output falls by 0.25% as well as inflation by 0.05%, but this is reverted after 1 period.
This finding is frequent in the literature and denominated as the price puzzle.
20
reverts. However, unlike in the DSGE models, the model has eventually reached a 1
new steady state, where bank loans, deposits and equity are permanently 1.1%, 0.7% 2
and 0.1% above the previous pre-shock level. 22 Hence a technology improvement in 3
the behavioural model will have long-lasting positive effects on the banking sector 4
and financial efficiency. 5
4.1.3 Shock to utilization costs 6
The second of the supply side shocks is a 0.5% decrease in the cost of utilizing capital 7
in production (i.e. a positive supply-side shock). This will therefore increase the 8
marginal benefit (or return to capital), which will lead to an increase in the demand 9
for capital. Hence, capital good producers will produce more, and so investment 10
rises (0.02%). The level of capital will also rise significantly (0.2%) as a result of 11
both capital demand-and supply expansion. Therefore, output will expand (0.1%). 12
Because of the higher capital (and thus collateral) and the resulting fall in the 13
financing spread, the quantity of credit to firms will expand (0.7%). Since this is an 14
improvement on the supply side, inflation initially falls (0.03%), and the monetary 15
authority reacts by reducing the interest rate (0.15%). This is reverted as soon as 16
the monetary authority increases the interest rate (0.02%) because of the recovery 17
in the inflation. Following 15 years after the shock, in the new steady state, firm 18
credit and deposits are 0.6% and 0.2% above the pre-shock level. Again a temporary 19
supply-side shock is having permanent effects on financial sector activity. 20
4.1.4 Impulse responses and learning 21
To test the sensitivity of our impulse responses to learning, which is a fundamental 22
component of the behavioural model, we simulate the same impulse response but 23
simply varying the learning parameter γ (keeping the model structure, shock process, 24
and size of the shock equal across). As we described in the model outline (section 25
2.3), γ determines the willingness to learn from past performance, where γ = 0 26
means zero willingness, and γ = N (where N is a large number) means a very strong 27
willingness to learn. In other words, small values of γ denote slow learning, and 28
large values denote fast learning. To evaluate this responsiveness, we depict the 29
impulse response of output and inflation to a monetary policy shock for values of γ 30
22In standard DSGE models, this is only possible to achieve with permanent or continuous
shocks.
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from 0 (no learning) to 1000.23 These are depicted in Figure II.3.1
We find the same pattern for both impulse responses. The larger the γ param-2
eter, the more hump-shaped is the impulse response as the cycles are extended.3
In particular, the initial drop is larger, longer-lasting, while also the subsequent4
(but smaller) rise is more pronounced. Intuitively, the stronger the learning mech-5
anism, the more profound will be the transmission of a shock, keeping the shock6
size constant. Yet, when no learning occurs (γ = 0) the utilities in learning become7
stochastic, and so contemporaneous market sentiment dominates the cycles and de-8
termines the impulse responses. That is why we see very heavy swings in the two9
responses in Figure II.3.10
To conclude this section, learning is a powerful propagator of shocks. In a set of11
experiments, we have shown that the quicker (or stronger) the learning (friction),12
the more pronounced will be the impulse responses since these generate higher per-13
sistence. However, if no learning takes place, then the responses become very curved,14
reflecting the stochastic utility in learning. Moreover, in a recent paper, Gerba and15
Zochowski (2017) have compared a very similar learning set-up to one with only16
rational expectations (keeping the rest of the model structure equal). They show17
that when beliefs and learning are removed, the impulse responses to the same shock18
become smaller and non-persistent.19
4.2 Distributions and statistical moments over the business20
cycle21
The second part of the model evaluation consists of analysing and validating the22
model-generated distribution and statistical moments over the business cycle. These23
are generated using the entire sample period of 2000 quarters. For our purposes,24
we will use the data on second and higher moments in Tables II.2 and II.3, the25
evolution of the model variables over the business cycle in Figures II.7 to II.8, as26
well as histograms of a selection of these variables in Figure II.9. Note for the graphs27
that we are plotting the business cycles over a sub-sample period of 100 quarters.28
23We tried also larger values, but after γ = 1000 the IRFs do not change significantly, which we
take as 1000 being an upper limit on the speed of learning.
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4.2.1 Macroeconomic aggregates 1
The short-term cycles of output, inflation and the interest rate are asymmetric. 2
While the amplitude of expansions is in general higher for output, the duration of 3
recessions is longer. This is further confirmed by the histogram for output, which is 4
asymmetric and skewed to the right, with a higher probability mass on the left of 5
the mean of the distribution. Moreover, the autocorrelation of output is very high 6
(0.86), as is the volatility (2.17) and it is leptokurtic (kurtosis=10.91). 7
The opposite applies to inflation. The amplitude of deflationary periods is in 8
general higher, while the duration of inflationary periods is longer. From histogram, 9
the distribution of inflation is slightly skewed to the left. In line with the data, 10
inflation is three times less volatile than output but has a very similar kurtosis to 11
output. Further, inflation is very persistent over time (ρ = 0.74) and countercyclical 12
(-0.42), exactly as in the US data (-0.43). 13
Turning to the (risk-free) interest rate, it is mostly positive and remains above 14
the trend for a longer period over the cycle. It is also highly correlated with the 15
business cycle (0.39) as well as with inflation (0.57), indicating a firm inflation target 16
on the part of the monetary authority. It is almost as volatile as output (0.95), but 17
highly skewed to the left (-4.29) compared to the general business cycle. 18
4.2.2 Firm and supply-side variables 19
Looking at Figure II.8, capital stock is mostly positive over the cycle, with a mean- 20
reversion around 1. This is in line with the data on inventories, which shows it is 21
positive mean-reverting. It is highly persistent (ρ = 0.95) and correlated with output 22
(0.45). It is also highly positively correlated with animal spirits (0.34). Distribution- 23
wise, it is less volatile than the business cycle (0.413), but heavily skewed to the 24
right (3.48). 25
The first thing one notes from utilization costs is that while apparently more 26
volatile, it oscillates within a much smaller interval compared to any of the other 27
model variables. Hence, the volatility is 4 times smaller compared to output. In 28
addition, it reverts around a mean of approx. 0.5. This is in line with the data, 29
which points towards a largely non-negative cost in utilizing capital over the cycle. 30
It is however weakly countercyclical (-0.1), and symmetric as well as mesokurtic. 31
The cash-in-advance constraint (or percent of external credit used for capital 32
input purchases) is strictly non-negative and acyclical (0.02). It is also independent 33
23
from the cycles of capital- (-0.01), and financing spread (0.01). In addition, the1
distribution of ϑt is highly volatile, skewed to the right and leptokurtic. Effectively,2
with 95% probability (or higher) ϑt is significantly above zero.3
On the other hand, the financing spread for firms is highly countercyclical (-0.41),4
as well as negatively correlated with animal spirits (-0.12). This is consistent with5
the model set-up and data, which shows that during expansions both the real risk6
(via a higher collateral value) and the perceived risk (via the optimistic sentiment)7
of loan default falls, which pushes down the risk premium and so the spread. The8
opposite holds for recessions. That is why the spread is both negatively correlated9
with the business cycle (collateral value), and with the market sentiment (agents’10
risk perception). Statistically, the spread is as volatile as the general business cycle,11
but highly skewed to the left, meaning that for most of the time the spreads will12
be close to zero (or negative), This is further confirmed by the graph in Figure13
II.8. However, with some non-negligible probability, the spread can spike, causing14
a severe contraction in liquidity, and the banking market.24 These results are also15
in line with the (model-generated) statistical moments on loan supply, which is16
procyclical (0.11), positively correlated with animal spirits (0.12) and capital-net17
worth (0.28), but negatively correlated with the financing spread (-0.1)18
4.2.3 Market sentiment19
An important driver of the business cycle is the market sentiment (or animal spirits).20
It is highly procyclical (0.84) throughout the entire sample period (see Figure II.7).21
Moreover, we observe a higher persistence during the pessimistic interval compared22
to the optimistic. This is in line with our previous observation on the general23
business cycle (or output) showing that recessions have a longer duration compared24
to expansions. Moreover, market sentiment has fat tails on the left and right of the25
mean, but is smoother than the general business cycle.26
4.2.4 Moment matching27
The next step in model validation consists of matching the (model generated) mo-28
ments to the US data. For that, we have calculated the statistical moments for all29
24However, the spread is not persistent (ρ = 0.01) implying an RBC type of frictionless financial
sector, and non-staggered price setting. That is not a surprise for the current model since the
financial market is modelled in reduced form. However, future work should try to extend the
model by modelling a more complex and empirically consistent financial price setting mechanism.
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variables using the longest data sample period available from 1953:I - 2014:IV.25 1
Following Stock and Watson (1998), we choose 1953:I as the starting year of our 2
sample since the (post-war) quarters prior to 1953 include noise and inaccuracies in 3
the data recording. The sample includes 247 quarters (or 62 years) which is the clos- 4
est approximation available for the long-run (cyclical) moments that is generated by 5
the model. During this period, the US economy experienced 10 cycles (using NBER 6
business cycle dates), and the average GDP increase (quarter-on-quarter) during 7
expansions was 1.05% while it was -0.036% during recessions. The data were down- 8
loaded from Flow of Funds at the Fed St Louis database. These were de-trended 9
using a standard two-sided HP-filter before their moments were calculated.26 A full 10
list of variables and other details can be found in Table II. 11
The behavioural model matches precisely the correlations of many supply-side 12
and financial variables. This includes credit to firms, deposits, the (risk-free) interest 13
rate, inflation, and firm financing spread. It is also very successful in reproducing 14
the autocorrelations of output, capital, and inflation, as well as the correlations 15
between capital and credit to firms, and inflation and the (risk-free) interest rate. 16
However, there is room for improvement in matching stock variables, such as firm 17
and bank net worth, some macroeconomic aggregates (investment mainly) as well 18
as the autocorrelation of firm financing spread. While in the model they are all 19
acyclical and lack persistence, in the data they are highly procyclical and persistent. 20
Turning to (relative) second-, third-, and fourth moments, the model is highly 21
successful in reproducing the moments of inflation, the (risk-free) interest rate, credit 22
to firms, deposits, and net worth of banks. It is also successful in making net worth 23
of firms more skewed and more leptokurtic than output. However, the moments of 24
the latter are higher in the model compared to US data. On the other hand, capital 25
and investment are smoother in the model. 26
Another strength of the model lies in reproducing irregular business cycles. In 27
contrast to standard first-, second-, or even third order approximated DSGE models. 28
the behavioural model generates substantial asymmetries between expansions and 29
recessions as well as produces non-Gaussian probability distribution functions for 30
most variables. That is much more in line with the observed pattern in the US 31
cyclical data. Nonetheless, for some variables (net worth, consumption, savings, 32
(risk free) interest rate, and credit to firms) the model generates excessive skewness 33
25The most recent data recorded is for 2014:IV using Fed St Louis database on March 2, 2015.
26This is in order to allow for a smoother comparison with the model generated (cyclical)
moments.
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and/or kurtosis.1
To sum up, the model matches most of the US data. This includes supply-side2
and financial variables such as the (risk-free) interest rate, inflation, credit to firms,3
deposits, firm financing spread and net worth of banks. It is also successful in4
matching several supply-side relations (capital-firm credit, inflation-interest rate) as5
well as their autocorrelations (output, capital and inflation) There is, however, some6
scope for improvement in matching demand-side variables (such as consumption,7
savings, investment) as well as stocks (net worth of firms).8
4.2.5 Persistence in the behavioural model9
An alternative way to evaluate the persistence a model generates is to look at the full10
spectrum of autocorrelations generated in the model. In other words, a model may11
be able to generate high autocorrelation of order one, but this may decay quickly12
for orders larger than 1. This is usually the case for DSGE models with standard13
shocks. Therefore, a more robust way to evaluate the (endogenous) persistence that14
a model generates is to look at much larger lag lengths. To do so, we depict the15
autocorrelation function (ACF) of order ten of the key variables in the model. We16
report the ACFs of output, inflation, interest rate, capital, investment, utilization17
costs, deposits, and animal spirits in Figures II.1 and II.2.18
The first thing to note from the figures is that some variables are very persistent19
over time, while others are not. The model is capable of generating high (endoge-20
nous) persistence in inflation, capital, deposits, (risk-free) interest rate, output and21
animal spirits, and a much lower persistence (lower autocorrelation parameter) for22
investment and utilization costs. Second, output, inflation, and interest rate have a23
rapid decaying (low ρ) autoregressive process, while stock variables such as capital or24
deposits have a slow (high ρ) one. This is because the second category of variables25
has an (autoregressive) evolutionary process that they follow, which makes them26
exhibit high time-inertia. Third, some variables, such as investment and utilization27
costs exhibit a periodic behaviour (since their autoregressive process ρ is periodic)28
and so may have an AR(2) process.29
In parallel, the standard errors bands of the third and fourth model moments in30
Table II.4 are relatively tight. We report the 66% bands in our exercises. Even for31
investment, which has a high kurtosis and skewness, the confidence band is tight32
around the mean estimate of moments. This means that there is low uncertainty33
regarding the moment estimates, and thus they are precise.34
26
In short, the model is capable of generating diverse levels of persistence in the 1
model. While many variables are highly persistent with a high autocorrelation 2
parameter, others have lower persistence but with a periodic behaviour, just as an 3
AR(2) process. Moreover, the model-generated moments reported in the tables are 4
precise and a good reflection of the diverse and asymmetric dynamics that this model 5
can generate. 6
4.2.6 The nature of business cycles 7
Next, we wish to understand to what extent the model is capable of generating 8
inertias in the business and financial cycles. 9
As discussed in Milani (2012) and DeGrauwe and Macchiarelli (2015), business 10
cycle movements in a rational expectations environment arise as a result of exoge- 11
nous shocks (including the autoregressive structure of shocks), leads and lags in the 12
endogenous transmission of shocks (such as lagged or expected output), habit forma- 13
tion, interest rate smoothing, or nominal rigidities (price and wage stickiness). One 14
could therefore call this “exogenously created” business cycle fluctuations. The be- 15
havioural model, on the other hand, generates inertia and business cycle fluctuations 16
even in the absence of endogenous frictions, lags in endogenous transmissions, and 17
autocorrelation shock structures, as shown in De Grauwe (2012).27 In the current 18
case, however, we have introduced supply-side and financial market frictions, as well 19
as leads and lags in the output, inflation and capital transmission mechanisms.28 20
This is in order to set the behavioural model at par with a standard DSGE model, 21
so to facilitate the comparison between the two frameworks. 22
The evolution of the different model variables over the business cycle are reported 23
in figures II.7 and II.8. The time period covered is 100 quarters, which is enough to 24
cover multiple cycles.29 The first thing to note is that with this “snapshot” of the 25
business cycle, we have managed to capture one long cycle (with a high amplitude) 26
followed by several shorter cycles. Not only is the business cycle peak the highest 27
during those 25 years (t = 295), but the amplitude is also the widest (between 28
t = [280 : 300] counting from trough to trough). Moreover, the subsequent bust 29
27De Grauwe (2012) analyses only 3 variables in his paper: output, inflation and animal spirits.
On the other hand, in the current paper we will analyse and contrast many more variables in order
to get a holistic view of the business cycle performance of the model.
28Note that capital only has lagged transmission structure, no leads are incorporated. That is
standard in the macroeconomics literature.
29The model is simulated over 2000 quarters, so data and figures for the longer time period are
available upon request.
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following the high boom is the sharpest, since it takes the economy more than 401
quarters to return to a level above the long-run trend (or above the zero line). In2
addition, the subsequent expansions are significantly weaker, somewhat implying3
that some fundamental (or structural) changes occurred in the economy following4
the preceding boom and bust.30 Compare that to the boom preceding the Great5
Recession and the subsequent bust in the US.6
Closely related to above observations, we find that the other variables experience7
similar cycles (inflation, interest rate, capital and the financing spread). Because8
the model concentrates on the supply side (with a weak demand-side) and we only9
employ supply side shocks, inflation falls when output rises (and vice versa).31 So10
during the period of sharpest expansion of the business cycle, inflation experiences11
its sharpest decline. In contrast to output, however, inflation oscilliates relatively12
evenly around zero (i.e. we don’t observe any temporal shifts in the trend).13
As expected, the interest rate responds elastically to the evolution of inflation14
(see Figure II.8). Nevertheless, it is smoother than inflation since we have included15
an interest rate lag in the Taylor rule (see De Grauwe and Macchiarelli, 2014),16
which smoothens the reaction of the interest rate to current inflation. We also17
observe a lag in the response of inflation to monetary policy over the cycle, in line18
with observations from the data.19
Capital, on the other hand, is positively skewed and is mostly above the zero line20
during the entire period. Since it is a stock variable, that is to be expected and in line21
with the US data (see table II.3). In addition, capital accumulates the most during22
the long expansionary period discussed above, and contracts under the proceeding23
episode. Just as the general business cycle, the subsequent capital accumulations24
are weaker, and the stock of capital is still below it’s pre-crisis level 40 quarters (or25
10 years) after the bust. Contrast that to the Great Recession episode.26
In the same vein, utilization costs are also positively skewed (see Figure II.9),27
but more volatile than output. This is to be expected since utilization cost function28
is of second order (see equation 5) and depends directly on the production capacity.29
Therefore the volatility of production will be squared, which increases the fluctua-30
tions in the cost. Also, as Figure II.8 shows, the more capital is accumulated and31
used in production, the higher utilization costs the producer will face (due to the32
inherent trade-offs explained in subsection 2.1.2). The correlation between the two33
30However, to confirm this fact one would need to perform a structural breaks analysis on the
full data, which includes the trend.
31See Figure II.8 for the correlation between output and inflation during the entire period.
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is positive throughout the entire period. 1
The next thing to note is the high degree of asymmetry over the business cycle. 2
As histograms in Figure II.9 confirm, all variables are skewed. Meanwhile output 3
and asset prices are positively skewed (skewed to the right), inflation, capital and (in 4
particular) utilization costs are negatively skewed (skewed to the left). Taking into 5
account the distribution of animal spirits in Figure II.9 and asset prices in Figure 6
II.9, this implies that pessimistic phases (or busts) dominate optimistic ones (or 7
booms). 8
Just as in the DeGrauwe (2011,12) and DeGrauwe and Macchiarelli (2015) mod- 9
els, output is highly correlated with animal spirits throughout the entire period. It’s 10
correlation with animal spirits is 0.83 (see table II.2). We can interpret the role of 11
animal spirits in the model as follows. When the animal spirits index clusters in the 12
middle of the distribution we have tranquil periods. There is no particular optimism 13
or pessimism, and agents use a fundamentalist rule to forecast the output gap. At 14
irregular intervals, however, the economy is gripped by either a wave of optimism 15
or of pessimism. The nature of these waves is that beliefs get correlated. Opti- 16
mism breeds optimism; pessimism breeds pessimism. This can lead to situations 17
where everybody has become either optimist or pessimist. The index then becomes 18
1 respectively 0. These periods are characterized by extreme positive or extreme 19
negative movements in the output gap (booms and busts). 20
Let us continue by examining one of the novelties of this model, the share of 21
loans used for capital input pre-payment. It is clear from Figure II.8 that when 22
the economy expands and the stock market booms, the share of loans required by 23
CGP for the capital pre-payment is very low, and often zero. This is because of the 24
stock market booms implying a low probability of default for entrepreneurs (since it’s 25
collateral value is high, or loan-to-value ratio low). Because of this low probability of 26
default, entrepreneurs will be able to borrow more, increasing their (expected) cash 27
positions and so CGP will not require a pre-payment. In contrast during busts, and 28
in particular during a sharp contraction (as in t = [295, 300]) CGP become wary of 29
the entrepreneur’s ability to pay their capital purchases in the next period (because 30
of an expected lower cash position of entrepreneurs, or reduced production), and 31
therefore require a high share to be pre-paid. The higher the contraction, the higher 32
the share required to be pre-paid (see lower graph in Figure II.8). The model is 33
capable of generating these asymmetries over the cycle, in particular in relation to 34
the cash position of entrepreneurs. 35
29
To conclude, we see a strong co-movement between asset prices on one hand, and1
net worth and the financing spread. During stock market booms, net worth rises2
which increases the firm’s collateral value and reduces its probability of default, and3
so it reduces the external financing spread (as it is less risky for banks to lend to4
firms).5
4.2.7 Comparison to a benchmark model6
In order to appreciate the added value of this additional model feature, we compare7
the statistical moments and distributions to a benchmark version where supply side8
financial frictions are not included, as in De Grauwe and Macchiarelli (2015). The9
results for this model version are included in the third column of Table 1, and the10
distributions and evolution of a selection of variables are depicted in Figures II.1011
and II.11. The column on the left depicts the figures in the full model, while those12
on the right depict those of the benchmark model. Note that the scales and axes in13
both set of figures are the same, so to facilitate a quick visual comparison.14
Beginning with the table, the full model matches the data much better than15
the benchmark version. Not only are the moments of the full model much closer16
to the data, but in several cases, the moment of the full model is very close to the17
empirical counterpart and contrary to those of the benchmark model. This means18
that including supply side financial friction indeed improves the moment fit of the19
data.20
Turning to the (cyclical) evolution of key model variables, in general we find21
that the model with supply side financial frictions generates additional volatility in22
all three variables (output, inflation and spread). Since in general, more frictions23
lead to higher cyclical amplitude, this is in line with the intuition, and proves the24
consistency of this model. At the same time, while benchmark model just generates25
modest business cycle movement, the full model is capable of generating both small26
and larger swings.27
Lastly, turning to distributions, we observe two things. First, those of benchmark28
model are more skewed to the left. Second, the distribution is more disperse, with29
higher probability mass away from the mean. In addition, for animal spirits we find30
that there is less mass in the middle, and more at the extremes, in particular on the31
right-hand side (or optimist region). The underlying reason is that animal spirits32
drive more of the model dynamics in the benchmark version, since there are less of33
other frictions. On the other hand, in the full model, supply-side financial frictions,34
30
Table 1: Model correlations
Correlations Full behavioural model Benchmark behavioural model US data
ρ(yt, yt−1) 0.86 0.65 0.85
ρ(yt, pit) -0.42 -0.12 -0.43
ρ(yt, dt) 0.17 0.30 0.32
ρ(yt, l
s
t ) 0.11 0.27 0.18
ρ(yt, xt) -0.41 -0.69 -0.49
ρ(yt, n
b
t) -0.01 0.02 0.45
ρ(yt, n
f
t ) -0.02 0.07 0.22
ρ(pit, pit−1) 0.74 0.69 0.93
ρ(pit, rt) 0.57 0.64 0.34
ρ(xt, xt−1) 0.01 -0.007 0.68
ρ(lst , xt) -0.09 -0.17 0.26
banking frictions and animal spirits all interact so that less variability comes from 1
animal spirits only, and the economy is less driven by market sentiment.32 2
5 Discussion and concluding remarks 3
Including credit frictions on the supply side is a novel way of thinking about financial 4
frictions in the macroeconomics literature. Sharp rises in stock prices do not only 5
allow firms to increase their credit and capital demand, but can equally reduce the 6
input costs for firms, or their input-output ratio. Conversely, a sharp drop in asset 7
prices can restrict the supply of credit to firms, which will increase the production 8
costs for firms, reduce the supply of capital, and (over time) reduce their production 9
capacity (or productivity). Including this mechanism in a behavioural model has 10
significantly improved the fit of the model to the data. 11
Impulse response analyses show that (temporary) supply-side shocks do not only 12
improve the fundamentals in the economy but cause a brief wave of market sentiment 13
(or animal spirit), which in the case of a positive shock result in a more-than pro- 14
portional increase in output, capital supply, bank equity, and fall in interest rate. 15
Moreover, credit supply to entrepreneurs is permanently increased, which implies 16
that firms can access a higher external financing in the future. This means that 17
productivity of firms is permanently improved. 18
Statistical validation of the model (including moment matching) show that the 19
32Note, however, that this is all in relative terms, and that in the full model animal spirits still
matter a lot for driving the cycles. Yet, because of other frictions, it now on its own matter less,
but interacts more with other “fundamental” frictions.
31
model is capable of capturing many of the supply-side relations found in the data.1
This includes supply-side and financial variables such as the (risk-free) interest rate,2
inflation, deposits, firm financing spread and net worth of banks. It is also successful3
in matching several supply-side relations (capital-firm credit, inflation-interest rate)4
as well as their autocorrelations (output, capital and inflation). Moreover, we find5
a strong co-movement between asset prices on one hand, and net worth and the6
financing spread. During stock market booms, net worth rises which increases the7
firm’s collateral value and reduces its probability of default, and so it reduces the8
external financing spread (as it is less risky for banks to lend to firms).9
There is, nevertheless, scope for improvement in matching demand-side vari-10
ables (such as consumption, savings, investment) as well as stocks (net worths of11
firms). Net worth of banks and firms are more volatile and asymmetric in the model12
compared to the data.13
There are multiple ways in which the current work can be extended. First, it14
would be highly interesting to contrast the agent-based framework to a DSGE model15
at par. In particular, it would be of high relevance to quantify the proportion of16
the results that are directly and exclusively generated by the learning framework17
. Hence, a rigorous comparison with a rational expectations model is necessary to18
extract this share.19
Taking into account the (global) capital market disruptions of 2008-09 and more20
recently the sovereign fund disruptions in the Eurozone, a second important exten-21
sion would be to study the type of market (agent) behaviour or (size of) shock that22
is necessary within this theoretical set-up in order to generate the financial market23
disruption that was observed in the Eurozone in 2012.24
A methodological extension would be to make use of the growing literature in25
forecast evaluation of agent-based models, and test the forecast performance of this26
model, in particular with respect to relevant competing models.27
Lastly, we calibrate our parameters in the model. An interesting exercise would28
be to estimate the parameters of the model in order to get a more accurate repre-29
sentation of the business cycles.30
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Appendices 6
I System of equations 7
Aggregate Demand: 8
Aggregate Demand: 9
yt = a1E˜tyt+1+(1−a1)yt−1+a2(rt−E˜tpit+1)+(a2+a3)efpt+(a1−a2)ψ(ut)kt+Adjt+t
(I.1)
10
Investment 11
it = e1E˜t[yt+1] + e2[rt + efpt − E˜t[pit+1]] (I.2)
12
External Finance Premium 13
efpt = φn¯tSt (I.3)
14
Consumption 15
ct = 1− st (I.4)
Aggregate Supply: 16
Cobb-Douglas Production Function 17
yt = at(ktψ(ut))
αhωt
1−α (I.5)
18
Utilization cost function 19
ψ(ut) = ξ0 + ξ1(ut − 1) + ξ2
2
(ut − 1)2 (I.6)
37
1Approximated Philips Curve:2
pit = b1E˜tpit+1 + (1− b1)pit−1 + b2yt + νt (I.7)
3
Capital evolution4
kt = (1− δ)ψ(ut)kt−1 + Ψit (I.8)
5
Cash-in-advance constraint6
St+1Kt+1 ≤ ϑt[St+1Kt+1 −Nt] (I.9)
7
Labour market8
yt =
ltwt
1− α (I.10)
Financial market:9
Bank net worth10
nbt = κ(l
s
t + n¯St) (I.11)
11
Evolution of bank leverage12
τt = τt−1 +
ldt
nft
(I.12)
13
Stock market price14
St =
Et[ ¯Λt+1]
Rst
≡ f [E˜tyt+1 + E˜tpit+1]
Rst
(I.13)
15
Firm net worth16
nft = Stn¯t =
1
τ
(LDt−1 + e1E˜tyt+1 + e2(rt + efpt − E˜tpit+1)) (I.14)
17
Deposits18
dt = dt−1 + st (I.15)
38
1Loan demand 2
ldt = l
d
t−1 + it (I.16)
3
Credit market equilibrium 4
ldt = l
s
t (I.17)
Learning environment: 5
Inflation learning 6
E˜tpit+1 = α
f
t E˜
f
t pit+1 + α
e
t E˜
e
t pit+1 (I.18)
7
Output learning 8
E˜tyt+1 = α
f
t E˜
f
t yt+1 + α
e
t E˜
e
t yt+1 (I.19)
9
Learning rules: 10
E˜ft pit+1 = pi
∗ (I.20)
11
E˜ft yt+1 = y
∗ (I.21)
12
E˜et pit+1 = θpit−1 (I.22)
13
E˜et yt+1 = θyt−1 (I.23)
14
Weights 15
αfpi,t =
exp(γU fpi,t)
exp(γU fpi,t) + exp(γU
e
pi,t)
(I.24)
16
αfy,t =
exp(γU fy,t)
exp(γU fy,t) + exp(γU
e
y,t)
(I.25)
17
αepi,t ≡ 1− αfpi,t =
exp(γU epi,t)
exp(γU fpi,t) + exp(γU
e
pi,t)
(I.26)
18
αey,t ≡ 1− αfy,t =
exp(γU ey,t)
exp(γU fy,t) + exp(γU
e
y,t)
(I.27)
Utilities: 19
U fpi,t = −
∞∑
k=0
wk[pit−k−1 − E˜ft−k−2pit−k−1]2 (I.28)
39
U fy,t = −
∞∑
k=0
wk[yt−k−1 − E˜ft−k−2yt−k−1]2 (I.29)
1
U epi,t = −
∞∑
k=0
wk[pit−k−1 − E˜et−k−2pit−k−1]2 (I.30)
2
U ey,t = −
∞∑
k=0
wk[yt−k−1 − E˜et−k−2yt−k−1]2 (I.31)
Shocks3
Monetary policy shock:4
rt = rt−1 + γpit + (1− γ)yt + mpt (I.32)
5
Technology shock6
Yt = At[
z
tψ(ut)Kt]
αL1−α (I.33)
7
Shock to utilization costs8
ψ(ut) = ξ0 + ξ1(ut − 1) + ξ2
2
(ut − 1)2 + uct (I.34)
9
uct = ρucuct−1 + uct (I.35)
Evolution of stock prices: Just as in De Grauwe and Macchiarelli (2015), the10
share price is derived from the stable growth Gordon discounted dividiend model:11
St =
Et[ ¯Λt+1]
Rst
where ¯Λt+1 are expected future dividends net of the discount rate,12
Rst . Agents in this set-up assume that the 1-period ahead forecast of dividends is a13
fraction f of the nominal GDP one period ahead, and constant thereafter in t+1,14
t+2, etc. Since nominal GDP consists of a real and inflation component, agents15
make forecast of future output gap and inflation according to the specification in16
subsection 2.3. This forecast is reevaluated in each period. As a result, in order to17
get the expected (stock) market price, the expected output gap and inflation needs18
to be defined.19
II Tables and Figures20
40
Table II.1: Parameters of the behavioural model and descriptions
Parameter Description Value
Calibrated Calibration
pi∗ The central bank’s inflation target 0
d1 Marginal propensity of consumption out of income 0.5
e1 Coefficient on expected output in investment eq. 0.1
d2 Coefficient on expected output in consumption eq. to match a1 = 0.5 0.5 ∗ (1− d1)− e2
d3 Coefficient on real rate in consumption eq. −0.01
e2 Coefficient on real rate in investment eq. to match a2 = −0.5 (−0.5) ∗ (1− d1)− d3
a1 Coefficient of expected output in output eq. (e1 + d2)/(1− d1)
a
′
1 Coefficient of lagged output in output eq. d2/(1− d1)
a2 Interest rate elasticity of output demand (d3 + e2)/(1− d1)
a3 Coefficient on spread term in output eq. −d3/(1− d1)
b1 Coefficient of expected inflation in inflation eq. 0.5
b2 Coefficient of output in inflation eq. 0.05
c1 Coefficient of inflation in Taylor rule eq. 1.5
ψ Parameter on firm equity −0.02
τ Firms’ leverage 1.43
κ Banks’ inverse leverage ratio 0.09
e Equity premium 0.05
αd Fraction of nominal GDP forecast in expected future dividends 0.2
n¯ Number of shares in banks’ balance sheets 40
n˜ Initial value for number of firms’ shares 60
β Bubble convergence parameter 0.98
c2 Coefficient of output in Taylor equation 0.5
c3 Interest smoothing parameter in Taylor equation 0.5
δ Depreciation rate of capital 0.025
α Share of capital in production 0.3
Ψ Adjustment cost function in investment 0.5
γ Switching parameter in Brock-Hommes (or intensity of choice parameter) 1
ρ Speed of declining weights in memory (mean square errors) 0.5
z Technological development parameter 0.5
ω Share of earnings paid out to shareholders 0
ξ Parameter 1 in the utilization cost function 0.8
ξ1 Parameter 2 in the utilization cost function 0.3
ξ2 Parameter 3 in the utilization cost function 0.25
ψ(.) Utilization cost function 0.80
zt Std. deviation of technology shock 0.5
mpt Std. deviation of nom. interest rate shock 0.5
uct Std. deviation of shock in the utilization cost function 0.5
ρk AR process of shock to utilization cost function 0.1
41
Table II.2: Model correlations - comparisons
Correlations Value - behavioural model Value - US data
ρ(yt, yt−1) 0.86 0.85
ρ(yt, kt) 0.45 0.15
ρ(yt, pit) -0.42 -0.43
ρ(yt, ast) 0.84 -
ρ(yt, ADt) 0.17 -
ρ(yt, ASt) -0.11 -
ρ(yt, ψ(ut)) -0.01 -
ρ(yt, dt) 0.17 0.32
ρ(yt, l
s
t ) 0.11 0.18
ρ(yt, rt) 0.39 0.45
ρ(yt, it) 0.23 0.90
ρ(yt, ct) 0.21 0.32
ρ(yt, st) 0.26 -0.28
ρ(yt, xt) -0.41 -0.49
ρ(yt, ϑt) 0.02 -
ρ(kt, kt−1) 0.96 0.88
ρ(kt, ast) 0.32 -
ρ(kt, ϑt) 0.02 -
ρ(kt, rt) 0.08 0.31
ρ(lst , ast) 0.12 -
ρ(lst , kt) 0.28 0.38
ρ(lst , xt) -0.09 0.26
ρ(pit, pit−1) 0.74 0.93
ρ(pit, ast) -0.38 -
ρ(rt, rt−1) 0.83 0.96
ρ(pit, rt) 0.57 0.34
ρ(pit, rt−1) 0.49 0.34
ρ(xt, xt−1) 0.01 0.68
ρ(xt, ast) -0.12 -
ρ(xt, kt) -0.24 0.09
ρ(xt, ϑt) 0.01 -
ρ(ϑt, ast) 0.007 -
ρ(yt, n
b
t) -0.01 0.45
ρ(yt, n
f
t ) -0.02 0.22
Note: GDP deflator was used as the inflation indicator, 3-month
T-bill for the risk-free interest rate, the deposit rate as the savings
indicator and the Corporate lending risk spread (Moody’s 30-year
BAA-AAA corporate bond rate) as the counterpart for the firm
borrowing spread in the models. The variables that are left blank
do not have a direct counterpart in the data sample. These are also
called ’deep variables’. The only way is to estimate a structural
model (using for instance Bayesian techniques) and to derive a
value based on a (theoretical) structure. Alternatively, one could
also approximate values using micro data. However, this is outside
the scope of this paper. 42
Table II.3: Second and higher moments
Variable Symbol Standard deviation model Standard deviation data Skewness model Skewness data Kurtosis model Kurtosis data
Output yt 2.17 0.93 0.21 1.45 10.91 -0.44
Inflation pit 0.35 0.50 -1.81 -0.66 0.36 3.54
Capital kt 0.42 1.50 1.24 0.82 0.37 -1.66
Financing spread xt 1 0.18 20.9 -5.8 27.9 58.6
Animal spirits ast 0.15 - 0.19 - 0.18 -
Deposits dt 3.72 1.36 -0.52 1.36 0.17 4.54
Loans lst 5.07 3.55 1.90 -0.61 0.17 3.75
Interest rate rt 0.95 0.76 -4.29 -1.27 1.1 2.38
Investment it 0.24 3.08 -7.81 1.18 9.54 0.71
Utilization costs ψ(ut) 0.24 - -0.05 - 0.05 -
Pre-payment share ϑt 73.89 - 3.89 - 53.5 -
Consumption ct 0.24 0.81 7.05 0.37 9.79 0.14
Savings st 0.24 8 -7.1 0.49 9.82 8.39
Net worth banks nbt 4.45 1.32 -4.43 -2.34 52.66 9.39
Net worth firms nft 73.9 2.21 -3.86 -0.34 53.52 16.37
Asset prices St 1.23 6.8 -3.33 1.27 53.75 2.11
Note: The moments are calculated taking output as the denominator. Following a standard approach in the DSGE literature, this is in order to examine the moments
with respect to the general business cycle. These are calculated using the full sample of US data stretching from 1953:I - 2014:IV. During this period, the US economy
experienced 10 cycles (using NBER business cycle dates), and the average GDP increase per quarter during expansions was 1.05% while it was -0.036% during recessions.
The data were de-trended using a standard two-sided HP filter before the moments were calculated in order to facilitate comparison with the model generated (cyclical)
moments. The variables that are left blank do not have a direct counterpart in the data sample. These are also called ’deep variables’. The only way is to estimate a
structural model (using for instance Bayesian techniques) and to derive a value based on a (theoretical) structure. Alternatively, one could also approximate values using
micro data. However, this is outside the scope of this paper.
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Figure II.1: Model autocorrelation functions (ACF) of lag length 10 of (from left
to right and top to down): output, inflation, interest rate, capital, investment, and
utilization costs
46
Figure II.2: Model autocorrelation functions (ACF) of lag length 10 of (from left to
right): deposits and animal spirits
Figure II.3: Impulse responses of output (top) and inflation (down) to a (negative)
monetary policy shock for different values of the learning (in switching) parameter
γ. γ = 0 implies no learning at all, while the bigger the γ, the quicker the learning.
47
Figure II.4: Full impulse responses to an expansionary monetary policy shock with
95% confidence interval. The impulse responses reported are (from left to right, and
top to down): output, inflation, interest rate, animal spirits, investment, capital,
deposits, and loans.
48
Figure II.5: Full impulse responses to an expansionary technology shock with 95%
confidence interval. The impulse responses reported are (from left to right, and
top to down): output, inflation, animal spirits, interest rate, investment, capital,
deposits, and loans.
49
Figure II.6: Full impulse responses to shock in utilization cost with 95% confidence
interval. The impulse responses reported are (from left to right, and top to down):
output, inflation, animal spirits, interest rate, investment, capital, deposits, and
loans.
50
Figure II.7: Evolution of the key aggregate variables and agent behaviour. The
figures depict the evolution of (from left to right, and top to down): output, inflation,
interest rate, fraction of extrapolators in forecasting output, fraction of extrapolators
in forecasting inflation, and animal spirits between t=[250:350] or 25 years.
51
Figure II.8: Evolution of the key aggregate variables 2. The figures depict the
evolution of (from left to right, and top to down): capital, stock prices, utilization
costs, percent of external loans used for input purchases, net worth of firms, and
external financing spread between t=[250:350] or 25 years
52
Figure II.9: (Ergodic) distributions for the full sample (t=2000 quarters) of the
following variables: output, inflation, animal spirits, capital, stock prices, and uti-
lization costs.
53
Figure II.10: Comparison between the (cyclical) evolution of key aggregate variables
in the full model version (left) and the benchmark version (right) where the supply
side financial friction is not present for the time interval t=[250:350] or 25 years.
The reported variables in both columns are (from top-down): output, inflation, and
external financing spread.
54
Figure II.11: Comparison of (ergodic) distributions with the full sample (t=2000)
between the full model version (left) and the benchmark version (right) where the
supply side financial friction is not present. The reported variables in both columns
are (from top-down): output, inflation, and animal spirits. The scales are the same
in the left and right column to facilitate a quick visual inspection.
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